Meta-Critique of a Published Critique

Link to the original analysis of the 1889 cylinder recording of Johannes Brahms' piano performance of a segment of his First Hungarian Dance.

Though it is not structured in the same way, this analysis follows the most important rule of the eclectic analysis which is to form the analysis around the work.  The goal is to explore this short, noise-filled recording for the nature of Brahms' performance and a window into the past.  The analysis starts off with a bit of historical background about Brahms, and a more lengthy historical background simply about the recording itself. Here, the analysis provides enough data to teach the reader about the difficulties surrounding this out of use recording style (by cylinders).  The amount of information given about HOW to denoise, however, slightly distracts the reader from the text.  Perhaps this portion might be limited if it is to be presented to a reader who is mostly interested in the particularities of the music itself. 

The author takes a section for general observation or as we might call it, an open viewing of the recording.  Then, the reader is provided with at-length syntactical analysis in which every piece of data is scrutinized.  Once again, the diagrams provide good insight as he compares a transcription of the recording with a transcription of the score. This comparison moves the author smoothly into a discussion of improvisation in brahms' performance, which was what the analyst hoped to uncover in the recording.  This leads him into a nice conclusion, which includes his own kind of meta-critique, instructing the reader about just how difficult it was to decipher the recording and how his attempts are merely a first step in the right direction. 

 Overall, this analysis is a huge success.  It provides a multitude of syntactical data from a recording that is barely audible.  It is true that much of the anaylsis was devoted to describing how things were done, which may or may not benefit the reader.  However, this analysis was limited in nature; due to the terrible quality of the recording, it would have been impossible construct any sort of sound-in-time analysis.

The recording in question can be heard here in its original form, throughout the denoising process and reconstructed as a midi file:  (© 1999 Jonathan Berger, CCRMA, Stanford University. All Rights Reserved.)

The original wax cylinder recording 1889

First step in denoising

Second step in denoising

Third step in denoising

Fourth step in denoising

The same phrase with a synthetic sound overlaid upon the voice that was 'excavated' by the denoising process

Midi reconstruction that takes all the data from the analysis of the recording and maps it onto the entire piece

Ferrara, "Phenomenology as a Tool for Musical Analysis"

Historically, the western mind has yearned to possess objective knowledge.   Current scientific philosophers and phenomenolgists alike, however, have begun to explore the idea of personal knowledge: "the personal (experiential) involvement of a 'knower' in all acts of understanding"(356).   In his article "Phenomenology as a Tool for Musical Analysis," Ferrara examines phenomenology as the means of incorporating experiential knowledge into music analysis.   The phenomenological method does not dominate or manipulate the work as it does in standard analysis, but rather it allows the work to question the analyst and the analyst to respond.  According to Ferrara, a work "functions not only as a series of solved problems to technical questions" but as a "polyphonic texture of syntactical, semantic, and ontological meanings" and therefore it must be attended to in a more human and complex way (357).

Ferrara chooses to analyze Edgard Varèse's Poème électronique, an atonal electronic piece of music, phenomenologically because he believes that most other theoretical approaches cannot function in analyzing this type of music.  In performing this analysis, he is attempting to prove "that applied music theory can be broadened to include the implementation of philosophical interpretation" (358). 

He begins with 3 open listenings.  He maintains that you can and should do as many open listenings as the work lends itself too.  After each listening, he records what he hears, building upon his observations each time, and by the third listening he even begins to try and categorize the sounds into some sort of basic sections.  This leads him into the first listening for syntactical form.  First he describes how he will approach the syntactical analysis - since it will not be as straightforward as a standard syntactical analysis that only works with tonal or structured music, he will have to structure the syntactical analysis around the piece - and then proceeds to analyze each section of the piece (he has broken it up into 10 sections).  Ferrara writes that it is difficult to bracket out "semantic" meanings in a piece like this and focus solely on syntax, since the syntax is made up of sounds like birds in a jungle and crashes which obviously have built-in references.  (This proves, once again, how the analyst must be open to the work and not stuck behind rules).  Syntax is approached on 2 levels in Ferrara's analysis.  Firstly, the analyst brackets out formal training to focus on sounds and textures, and secondly, the analyst may use traditional methods to uncover "higher levels of syntax" and to build upon the first more phenomenological analysis of the music (360).

Ferrara moves on to analyze semantic content and meaning in the work.  Again, there are 2 levels - the obvious, for example a bell tolling, and the second, which deals with a specific and deeper meaning for every sound, such as the bell tolling symbolizing time. Semantic meaning is symbolic and has to do with making references.

The third part of the analysis is onto-historical, which not only grows out of but clarifies the previous syntactical and semantic analysis'.    From listening to the work, Ferrara establishes that "Poème électronique crystallizes what it means to be in the modern era.  In our actual lives, technology (computers, automobiles, or electric can openers) surrounds our existence" (369).   This opens up the work to even more symbolic reference, such as: "The concept of "time ticking away or a heartbeat stopping underscores the importance of temporality in human being (370)".    Additionally, the free and sporadic nature of the music coming in and out of the listener's conciousness parallels the way that realities of our existence come in and out of our conciousness awareness without order.   The onto-logical analysis, therefore, elaborates upon and gives depth to the prior two steps.

The three levels of analysis described in the text are all inter-connected, constantly building upon each other.     In the final open listening, these levels come together to create "an intuitive sense of the whole" (371).  Certain passages, directions, etc. now stand out to Ferrara as he weaves his analysis together, and he is finally able to draw some solid conclusions based in experiential knowledge.

He concludes by stressing that there is no correct way to analyze a work.   He contends that the analysis and the work must be essentially bonded together, grounding the former in the latter.  "If the work functions at levels of meaning other than syntax, then so must the analysis.  Musical analysis must not be limited to a discussion of formal elements"(373).  Ferrara insists that music exists on a multiplicity of levels, and therefore must be approached from many different dimensions, as is explained in the phenomenological analysis.

Reaction

I was unsure why this was titled a "phenomenological analysis" - was the whole analysis supposed to be described in a phenomenological sense, or was the phenomenological element supposed to be the most important, with syntax, semantics, and onto-historical worlds to supplement it?  I was also confused by the syntax.  To me, the syntax seemed like a phenomenological analysis - it consisted of phrases like "juxtaposition of hard percussive sounds" and "round, deep tones" (364-5).  The first step of syntactical analysis especially, when the analyst brackets out formal training just to listen to sound is purely phenomenological in the sense that we have spoken of.  Overall, this entire analysis seems to take on a slightly different structure than the eclectic method, but I can see how the eclectic method grew from this.

Dickie, "Art and the Aesthetic" Chapter 5

In Chapter 5 of his text, "Aesthetic Attention: Disinterested Awareness," Dickie considers two common theories of aesthetic attention - those of Jerome Stolnitz and Eliseo Vivas.  Stolnitz's definition of the aesthetic attitude is characterized by "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone"(114).    Stolnitz's aesthetic attention has no concern for any hidden purpose in an object, but looks thoughtfully upon the object in question just to experience it's aesthetic.  Similarly, Vivas defines the aesthetic attitude as a fascinated attention on an object, accompanied by "the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meaning and values in their full presentational immediacy"(114).   Vivas believes that with by apprehending the inherent meanings, one can experience an object in real-time for what it is, aesthetically.  In this way, Stolnitz and Vivas both suggest that man possesses the power to access the aesthetic object and suspend all outside things through his own power and attitude.   Dickie points out however that it seems more appropriate to employ "distinterested awareness"  when one has some type of ulterior motive, such as to write a review of a sports game, yet it seems more useful to employ "intransitive attention" when one has a predetermined desire, such as for a team to win a game.  Therefore, he contends, it important to understand both theories in order to cover all cases in which they may be utilized.

Dickie questions the idea of interested attention.  He presents an example of a boy who looks at a painting of his father and instead of noting its color or expressive nature is reminded of his father.   By the theorists, this may be described as "attending transitively to the painting by using the work of art as a vehicle for associations, that is, as a case of attending with external factors in mind"(117).  Yet Dickie claims that this boy is simply inattentive to the painting, rather that interestedly aware of it, because as soon as the painting sparks his memory he becomes distracted from the work and begins attending to his own memories.  Dickie also considers a boy who knows of the man in the painting, although it is not his own father.  Here, Dickie makes an interesting claim: "The fact that a certain bit of knowledge about a painting may distract attention from it, does not prove that that certain bit of knowledge must distract attention"(119).  Just because this new boy knows who the subject of the painting is, does not mean that he does not possess the ability to fully appreciate and concentrate on the painting itself while he is concious of this relation.  Next, Dickie builds upon his ideas and contemplates an example of two boys listening to music, one of which is listening to analyze the piece while the other is simply listening with no ulterior purpose.   The theorists, Dickie asserts, understand the first boy to be interestedly aware, and the second one to be disinterestedly aware.  Yet Dickie contends the only claim that can be drawn from this example is: "people attend with different motives"(118).  The music is appreciated in different ways because the boys possess different motives, but there is really only one way of listening, or attending.

Dickie goes on to present examples of false disinterested awareness in other various art forms, like acting and literature: in each he builds up the same conclusion that there are no different types of attention.  When he explores literature, in specific, he notes Vivas' assertion that if a poem is approached non-aesthetically then it can only function in practical ways such as for social criticism or for history.  This appalls Dickie because, like Aldrich, Vivas is beginning to make claims without backing them up.  Dickie uses more character examples to disprove Vivas and spitefully concludes that theorists like Vivas "want us to ignore the historical content and social criticism in literature, as if they were somehow not proper aspects of literature" (124).   How one might employ this forced ignorance (or disinterested awareness) is unclear to Dickie.  This leads him to explore where the concept of disinterested awareness began.

It was originally thought that in order to experience beauty one must be disinterested, that is, "not influenced by regard for personal advantage" (124).   The idea literally became "disinterested contemplation" (contemplation without regard for personal advantage).   Then, however, it evolved into "contemplating something without regard to anything in which it stands in relation"(125).  He traces this back to a man named Hutcheson and his idea that the "sense of beauty is triggered by a certain sort of object independently of any relation in which such an object stands to any other thing"(125).  Dickie explains how Hutcheson's theory of disinterested senses does in fact make some sense, yet the new theories on disinterested consciousness are utterly confused.

Finally, Dickie attempts to show how the new theory on disinterested awareness has been used falsely to back up misguided conclusions on criticism and art appreciation.  He considers Stolnitz's assertion that criticizing artwork is distinctly different from appreciating it.  Stolnitz claims that critics of art seek reasons to back up evaluations of the work in question, while to appreciate the art requires a whole different kind of perception.  He also notes that criticism is good in preparation, but one should never be thinking in this analytical way during the free aesthetic experience.  Stolnitz is basically claiming that a critic is interestedly aware, however Dickie accuses Stolnitz in having no basis for his conclusions as Dickie himself precedes to conclude, once again, that the only thing that separates a critic and a non-critic is his motives, not his way of attending to the work (in which there can be no difference since there is only one way).  Dickie claims that a critic's search for reasons in an artwork are not "incompatible with the appreciation of art", but rather that in noting reasons (either subconsciously or consciously) one's appreciation is often amplified (129). Dickie expands by claiming that seeking out reasons is only being ready to notice things and this action does not have compete with appreciation; in many cases it would even be impossible to analyze, and then appreciate, such as during a live performance.  Dickie considers another common claim by aesthetic attitude theorists, that the moral values in an art work can often disrupt or distract our aesthetic attention.  He argues that not only do most art works have a moral point of view, but these views are often the most important aspects of the work.  There is, as Dickie states, no reason to treat this aspect of the work any differently, and even if there was reason, there is no way to do this.

REACTION

I was struck by Stolntiz's idea that one should not criticize a work during the actual aesthetic experience, because it reminded me of the eclectic method.  Whenever we have an open listening or viewing, we are freely and unquestioningly surrendering ourselves to the work.  Yet, in all other steps of the analysis, we are critically questioning the work at hand and its various aspects.  In this, we seem to be following Stolnitz and the aesthetic-attitude theorists, rather than Dickie.  However, the eclectic method also relates to Dickie in that it is never done with any step - it continues to build upon itself and "the finding of reasons goes on constantly"(130).  Articles such as this reveal how the formation of the eclectic method must have drawn upon many different theories on aesthetic.

Dickie, "Art and the Aesthetic" Chapter 6

In Chapter 6 of Dickie's Art and the Aesthetic entitled "Aesthetic Perception: Seeing As," he presents Virgil Aldrich's theory on aesthetic perception, and precedes to discount it.  Aldrich questions what the "'proper parts' of an aesthetic object" are in an artwork (135).   In answering this question, he maintains that through the use of "aesthetic perception," these 'proper parts' can be revealed to the viewer (136).  Aldrich strives to develop this idea of aesthetic perception as an objective way of experiencing the art object; meaning, the aesthetic in a work can be understood objectively rather than subjectively but only when the work is looked at in a certain way.

Aldrich considers ambiguous figures (figures that can be seen as representations of multiple things, such as a picture that can look like either a rabbit or a duck).   "What is seen (the representation) is conditioned by what one has in mind, but that what is seen 'is not just a thought or even just a subjective image; it is an object of perception of some sort'"(137).  He claims that each representation within the image is an object of perception, and uses this argument to prepare his main point that there exists 2 types of perception: ordinary (used in daily life and science), and aesthetic.    Dickie notes here that Aldrich relies too much on this example of ambiguous figures as the main model for his perception theory, and this becomes evident as Aldrich's theory does not move much from this example.  Regardless, after presenting these two types of perception, Aldrich presents the idea of a 'material thing'.  Basically, he argues that it can either be perceived as a "physical object" or an "aesthetic object," depending on which mode of perception is employed (138).

A diagram is now presented representing the way that an ambiguous figure is perceived.  On the left, there is the perceiving subject, from which three separate lines extend, and at the ends of which are three separate representations of the ambiguous figure.  Dickie comments on how this diagram describing the phenomenon of ambiguous figures "provides no basis for the two kinds of perception" (139).  Rather, it suggests that there is merely one form of perception that yields three separate aesthetic object.  Dickie then accuses Aldrich of using "impressive technical terminology" to state his theory without actually supporting it with evidence!

Dickie precedes to consider two of Aldrich's attempts at illustrating aesthetic perception in use.  Aldrich presents two examples in which ordinary things, a skyline at dusk  and a snowflake, are seen impressionistically.   Dickie however is not convinced by these examples, for "although it would seem to be all right to say that the protruding sky area [and snowflake] [have] a kind of impressionistic character, the fact does not justify saying that a special mode of perception has been isolated," which is what Aldrich had been attempting to prove (141-2).   For Dickie, the uncommon or pleasing nature of these examples provides Aldrich with no solid reason to claim that one must have used a special aesthetic mode of perception in order to perceive the objects in this way.  

Aldrich returns to his ideas on representations in ambiguous figures.  He claims these figures and their representations are seen impressionistically, as something that they are not in reality thought to be, and therefore aesthetically.  Dickie argues, however, that an aesthetic experience can not be found in every single seen representation.  Since Aldrich he asserts this claim and then stops without building up his argument, he leaves unclear what exactly he means by impressionistic viewing, and leaves his argument open for Dickie to tear apart.  Dickie asserts once again that "the usual way of looking at paintings is not like these ways of looking" that Aldrich has described and ultimately succeeds in making Aldrich look like a fool.  

Dickie finishes off his argument by stating that there is no justification in saying that there is a certain kind of aesthetic perception which an aesthetic object to reveal itself.  He does commend Aldrich for recognizing that the aesthetic objects are the 'proper objects' within a work that should be appreciating and critiqued, something that previous theorists had ignored.  However, Dickie makes his final claim against Aldrich, and against many previous theorists in this field, there exists no individual power in man "to change non-aesthetic characteristics into aesthetic ones or to make aesthetic features accessible"(145).  Aldrich attempted to make the aesthetic features of a work accessible by a special mode of perception, but the inevitable falsity in this theory became the perfect proof for Dickie's final conclusion.

REACTION

I agree with Dickie.   Let's say I am looking at an apple on my desk - am I to simply switch on my "aesthetic perception" and all of the sudden notice some striking aesthetic objects in the apple and in the way it is positioned and lighted on the desk?  It seems ridiculous that I could switch on and off different modes of perception in order to try and perceive different aspects of the same object.  Perhaps if Aldrich had backed up his claim better, I could understand his ideas on perception better, but Dickie disproved him so well that his claims look foolish to me now.  Additionally, Dickie's final conclusion about the inability of someone to make non-aesthetic objects into aesthetic ones or for someone to expose the aesthetic object himself seems justifiable.  I feel as though the exposure of the aesthetic object is something that the work does in itself as an entity after viewing it for a long time.  I also feel that the aesthetic object is to an extent individualized and subjective, as each person does not perceive the aesthetic nature of an artwork to be the same thing.  Perhaps this is reliant on a person's training, but I feel that the aesthetic object that I find in a work versus that which an art critic finds is can be just as pleasing or "correct."

Ferrara, Chapter VII: An Eclectic Method for Sound, Form, and Reference

Chapter VII of 'Philosophy and the Analysis of Music' gives an overview of the eclectic method and demonstrates how it is truly "circular" upon itself (185).    Though each step in the method has questions and a direction, each step must also have the capacity to be infiltrated by any unexpected levels of musical significance.  As an analyst, the key is to be responsive to what the artwork questions of you, and to "maintain a stance marked by openness" while working within the guiding principles of the methods (179).

The first step is to study the (mostly) musical history of both the time period that the composer wrote in and of the composer himself.  One asks both general and specific questions of this nature in order to gain historical data.  The second step is an open listening of the work, during which "the listener becomes oriented to the overall sound, structure, and message of the work" (181).  There is no specific way to engage in an open listening; one simply listens without prejudgement, and keeps their ears open to notions that will be later explored.  Step three is a "literal and direct" account of the syntax in a piece of music, and step four is a description of the sound-in-time which, unlike step three, employs a "poetic style" of descriptive language (182).   The fifth step, "the first level of referential meanings," analyzes musical representation; that is, the "meanings" of a piece of music that can be found in "a program or a text" (183).  The sixth step, and second level of referential meanings, is a report of how a piece of music is "expressive of human feelings"(183).  This step involves a hermeneutic or interpretive analysis which allows for the listener to discover virtual feelings in a work.  However, Ferrara warns that "during this step, the listener/analyst must exercise control over any proclivity to dominate the music by utilizing it for ordinary emotional release"(183).  It is important to stay detached, especially in step six, so that one's personal sentiments do not interfere with the message of the piece.    Step seven also uses hermeneutic analysis to uncover the cultural world of the composer within the piece of music.  It is important to note that both steps six and seven "must be grounded in the levels of the sound-in-time and syntax," instead of analyzed with suspended judgement.  In step seven, for example, one looks at how the cultural world relates with and emerges out of the syntax and sound, rather than giving a full and isolated cultural recount.

Although each step of the eclectic method functions independently, they are all brought together in Step Eight, the second open listening.  Ferrara maintains: "Each stratum remains perceptibly discreet yet there is an inner connective organicity that weaves them together in a dynamic state" (185).  In order to understand fully the complexity of a musical work, it is important to experience both the parts and the whole (multiple times), which is exactly what the eclectic method allows the analyst to do. 

The last two steps are a performance guide and a meta-critique.  The purpose of the former is to guide a potential performer in their comprehension of the work, whereas the latter is meant to provide the analyst with a chance to self-evaluate, and hopefully reveal to oneself ways in which the eclectic method and/or one's approach to it could be improved in the future.

Ferrara finishes off the chapter, and his discourse, by bridging the eclectic method together with Heidegger's philosophy of art.  Just as Heidegger believes "truth" happens in an artwork, Ferrara asserts that "music" happens "when [an] analyst responds to the multiplicity of levels of musical significance in [a] work"(185-6).   He maintains that the eclectic method, a method meant to respond and reconsider, is based upon this happening conception of music.  

REACTION

I enjoyed this short review of the eclectic method.  It rounded off the text nicely and demonstrated how each step moves smoothly into the next.  Additionally, the comparison Ferrara made to a pianist practicing a 4-part fugue was a nice parallel to the eclectic method.  It got the point across that if you take apart and closely examine each piece of something, and then put all the pieces back together, they will blend yet each part will inevitably retain something individual.  I also enjoyed the parallel between Heidegger's art philosophy and the eclectic method.  It elucidated why we studied Heidegger so in depth, and by reading text from two different authors (Ferrara and Heidegger) on the idea of a noun "happening" helped to both clarify and justify the concept.