Dickie, "Art and the Aesthetic" Chapter 6

In Chapter 6 of Dickie's Art and the Aesthetic entitled "Aesthetic Perception: Seeing As," he presents Virgil Aldrich's theory on aesthetic perception, and precedes to discount it.  Aldrich questions what the "'proper parts' of an aesthetic object" are in an artwork (135).   In answering this question, he maintains that through the use of "aesthetic perception," these 'proper parts' can be revealed to the viewer (136).  Aldrich strives to develop this idea of aesthetic perception as an objective way of experiencing the art object; meaning, the aesthetic in a work can be understood objectively rather than subjectively but only when the work is looked at in a certain way.

Aldrich considers ambiguous figures (figures that can be seen as representations of multiple things, such as a picture that can look like either a rabbit or a duck).   "What is seen (the representation) is conditioned by what one has in mind, but that what is seen 'is not just a thought or even just a subjective image; it is an object of perception of some sort'"(137).  He claims that each representation within the image is an object of perception, and uses this argument to prepare his main point that there exists 2 types of perception: ordinary (used in daily life and science), and aesthetic.    Dickie notes here that Aldrich relies too much on this example of ambiguous figures as the main model for his perception theory, and this becomes evident as Aldrich's theory does not move much from this example.  Regardless, after presenting these two types of perception, Aldrich presents the idea of a 'material thing'.  Basically, he argues that it can either be perceived as a "physical object" or an "aesthetic object," depending on which mode of perception is employed (138).

A diagram is now presented representing the way that an ambiguous figure is perceived.  On the left, there is the perceiving subject, from which three separate lines extend, and at the ends of which are three separate representations of the ambiguous figure.  Dickie comments on how this diagram describing the phenomenon of ambiguous figures "provides no basis for the two kinds of perception" (139).  Rather, it suggests that there is merely one form of perception that yields three separate aesthetic object.  Dickie then accuses Aldrich of using "impressive technical terminology" to state his theory without actually supporting it with evidence!

Dickie precedes to consider two of Aldrich's attempts at illustrating aesthetic perception in use.  Aldrich presents two examples in which ordinary things, a skyline at dusk  and a snowflake, are seen impressionistically.   Dickie however is not convinced by these examples, for "although it would seem to be all right to say that the protruding sky area [and snowflake] [have] a kind of impressionistic character, the fact does not justify saying that a special mode of perception has been isolated," which is what Aldrich had been attempting to prove (141-2).   For Dickie, the uncommon or pleasing nature of these examples provides Aldrich with no solid reason to claim that one must have used a special aesthetic mode of perception in order to perceive the objects in this way.  

Aldrich returns to his ideas on representations in ambiguous figures.  He claims these figures and their representations are seen impressionistically, as something that they are not in reality thought to be, and therefore aesthetically.  Dickie argues, however, that an aesthetic experience can not be found in every single seen representation.  Since Aldrich he asserts this claim and then stops without building up his argument, he leaves unclear what exactly he means by impressionistic viewing, and leaves his argument open for Dickie to tear apart.  Dickie asserts once again that "the usual way of looking at paintings is not like these ways of looking" that Aldrich has described and ultimately succeeds in making Aldrich look like a fool.  

Dickie finishes off his argument by stating that there is no justification in saying that there is a certain kind of aesthetic perception which an aesthetic object to reveal itself.  He does commend Aldrich for recognizing that the aesthetic objects are the 'proper objects' within a work that should be appreciating and critiqued, something that previous theorists had ignored.  However, Dickie makes his final claim against Aldrich, and against many previous theorists in this field, there exists no individual power in man "to change non-aesthetic characteristics into aesthetic ones or to make aesthetic features accessible"(145).  Aldrich attempted to make the aesthetic features of a work accessible by a special mode of perception, but the inevitable falsity in this theory became the perfect proof for Dickie's final conclusion.

REACTION

I agree with Dickie.   Let's say I am looking at an apple on my desk - am I to simply switch on my "aesthetic perception" and all of the sudden notice some striking aesthetic objects in the apple and in the way it is positioned and lighted on the desk?  It seems ridiculous that I could switch on and off different modes of perception in order to try and perceive different aspects of the same object.  Perhaps if Aldrich had backed up his claim better, I could understand his ideas on perception better, but Dickie disproved him so well that his claims look foolish to me now.  Additionally, Dickie's final conclusion about the inability of someone to make non-aesthetic objects into aesthetic ones or for someone to expose the aesthetic object himself seems justifiable.  I feel as though the exposure of the aesthetic object is something that the work does in itself as an entity after viewing it for a long time.  I also feel that the aesthetic object is to an extent individualized and subjective, as each person does not perceive the aesthetic nature of an artwork to be the same thing.  Perhaps this is reliant on a person's training, but I feel that the aesthetic object that I find in a work versus that which an art critic finds is can be just as pleasing or "correct."