Dickie, "Art and the Aesthetic" Chapter 5

In Chapter 5 of his text, "Aesthetic Attention: Disinterested Awareness," Dickie considers two common theories of aesthetic attention - those of Jerome Stolnitz and Eliseo Vivas.  Stolnitz's definition of the aesthetic attitude is characterized by "disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, for its own sake alone"(114).    Stolnitz's aesthetic attention has no concern for any hidden purpose in an object, but looks thoughtfully upon the object in question just to experience it's aesthetic.  Similarly, Vivas defines the aesthetic attitude as a fascinated attention on an object, accompanied by "the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meaning and values in their full presentational immediacy"(114).   Vivas believes that with by apprehending the inherent meanings, one can experience an object in real-time for what it is, aesthetically.  In this way, Stolnitz and Vivas both suggest that man possesses the power to access the aesthetic object and suspend all outside things through his own power and attitude.   Dickie points out however that it seems more appropriate to employ "distinterested awareness"  when one has some type of ulterior motive, such as to write a review of a sports game, yet it seems more useful to employ "intransitive attention" when one has a predetermined desire, such as for a team to win a game.  Therefore, he contends, it important to understand both theories in order to cover all cases in which they may be utilized.

Dickie questions the idea of interested attention.  He presents an example of a boy who looks at a painting of his father and instead of noting its color or expressive nature is reminded of his father.   By the theorists, this may be described as "attending transitively to the painting by using the work of art as a vehicle for associations, that is, as a case of attending with external factors in mind"(117).  Yet Dickie claims that this boy is simply inattentive to the painting, rather that interestedly aware of it, because as soon as the painting sparks his memory he becomes distracted from the work and begins attending to his own memories.  Dickie also considers a boy who knows of the man in the painting, although it is not his own father.  Here, Dickie makes an interesting claim: "The fact that a certain bit of knowledge about a painting may distract attention from it, does not prove that that certain bit of knowledge must distract attention"(119).  Just because this new boy knows who the subject of the painting is, does not mean that he does not possess the ability to fully appreciate and concentrate on the painting itself while he is concious of this relation.  Next, Dickie builds upon his ideas and contemplates an example of two boys listening to music, one of which is listening to analyze the piece while the other is simply listening with no ulterior purpose.   The theorists, Dickie asserts, understand the first boy to be interestedly aware, and the second one to be disinterestedly aware.  Yet Dickie contends the only claim that can be drawn from this example is: "people attend with different motives"(118).  The music is appreciated in different ways because the boys possess different motives, but there is really only one way of listening, or attending.

Dickie goes on to present examples of false disinterested awareness in other various art forms, like acting and literature: in each he builds up the same conclusion that there are no different types of attention.  When he explores literature, in specific, he notes Vivas' assertion that if a poem is approached non-aesthetically then it can only function in practical ways such as for social criticism or for history.  This appalls Dickie because, like Aldrich, Vivas is beginning to make claims without backing them up.  Dickie uses more character examples to disprove Vivas and spitefully concludes that theorists like Vivas "want us to ignore the historical content and social criticism in literature, as if they were somehow not proper aspects of literature" (124).   How one might employ this forced ignorance (or disinterested awareness) is unclear to Dickie.  This leads him to explore where the concept of disinterested awareness began.

It was originally thought that in order to experience beauty one must be disinterested, that is, "not influenced by regard for personal advantage" (124).   The idea literally became "disinterested contemplation" (contemplation without regard for personal advantage).   Then, however, it evolved into "contemplating something without regard to anything in which it stands in relation"(125).  He traces this back to a man named Hutcheson and his idea that the "sense of beauty is triggered by a certain sort of object independently of any relation in which such an object stands to any other thing"(125).  Dickie explains how Hutcheson's theory of disinterested senses does in fact make some sense, yet the new theories on disinterested consciousness are utterly confused.

Finally, Dickie attempts to show how the new theory on disinterested awareness has been used falsely to back up misguided conclusions on criticism and art appreciation.  He considers Stolnitz's assertion that criticizing artwork is distinctly different from appreciating it.  Stolnitz claims that critics of art seek reasons to back up evaluations of the work in question, while to appreciate the art requires a whole different kind of perception.  He also notes that criticism is good in preparation, but one should never be thinking in this analytical way during the free aesthetic experience.  Stolnitz is basically claiming that a critic is interestedly aware, however Dickie accuses Stolnitz in having no basis for his conclusions as Dickie himself precedes to conclude, once again, that the only thing that separates a critic and a non-critic is his motives, not his way of attending to the work (in which there can be no difference since there is only one way).  Dickie claims that a critic's search for reasons in an artwork are not "incompatible with the appreciation of art", but rather that in noting reasons (either subconsciously or consciously) one's appreciation is often amplified (129). Dickie expands by claiming that seeking out reasons is only being ready to notice things and this action does not have compete with appreciation; in many cases it would even be impossible to analyze, and then appreciate, such as during a live performance.  Dickie considers another common claim by aesthetic attitude theorists, that the moral values in an art work can often disrupt or distract our aesthetic attention.  He argues that not only do most art works have a moral point of view, but these views are often the most important aspects of the work.  There is, as Dickie states, no reason to treat this aspect of the work any differently, and even if there was reason, there is no way to do this.

REACTION

I was struck by Stolntiz's idea that one should not criticize a work during the actual aesthetic experience, because it reminded me of the eclectic method.  Whenever we have an open listening or viewing, we are freely and unquestioningly surrendering ourselves to the work.  Yet, in all other steps of the analysis, we are critically questioning the work at hand and its various aspects.  In this, we seem to be following Stolnitz and the aesthetic-attitude theorists, rather than Dickie.  However, the eclectic method also relates to Dickie in that it is never done with any step - it continues to build upon itself and "the finding of reasons goes on constantly"(130).  Articles such as this reveal how the formation of the eclectic method must have drawn upon many different theories on aesthetic.